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The purpose of this case study is to explore livelihood trajectories in the context of man-
made and natural disasters in three villages of Swat district, Pakistan. These three 
villages were deeply affected by an armed conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan 
Army from 2006 to 2009 separately by floods in 2010. This research is based on in-
depth qualitative analysis of 24 households to trace out the changes in household 
welfare and livelihood security aftermath of armed conflict and floods. 
The case evidence shows that majority of the households were facing declining 
livelihood security. Out of 24, only 7 households were found to cope with the crises 
while the remaining 17 were declining. The factors which enable coping households to 
maintain their livelihood security are international remittances, wealth, more male 
worker, government jobs and political connections. The factors which lead to the 
decline of majority of case households includes low or lack of livelihood diversification, 
human losses and injuries/illness especially the male worker, loss or sale of livestock. 
The most prominent responses induced by both the crises were internal as well as 
external migration for work. The medium and poor households were further pushed into 
more vulnerable conditions  
The study households received relief assistances from government, NGO, and informal 
sources but at different extent. However, the large number of households with declining 
livelihoods security indicates the inadequacy or limitations of assistance. Informal 
support system was weakened by the crises due to the reduced capacity of the people to 
extend support to each other and the people were relying to get support from their 
relatives, friends and non relatives in other parts of the country. 
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ACTED  Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 
ADB  Asian Development Bank 
CCPI  Center for Public Policy Research  
CBO  Community Based Organization 
FIFC  Fienstein International Famine Center 
GTZ  German Technical Cooperation 
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KP  Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 
NGOs  Non-governmental Organization 
PDMA  Provincial Disaster Management Authority 
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UN-Habitat  United Nation Agency for Human Settlements 
WFP  World Food Program 
WB  World Bank 
TNSM  Tehrik-ie- Nafazai Sharat Muhammadi 
IPRI  Islamabad Policy Research Institute  
Qwam  It is a social term used for tribe or clan 
Malak  Traditional village leader 
Khairat  Giving food or money to poor as religious obligation 
Zakaat            Obligatory payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds 
of property and used for charitable and religious purposes 
Jirga The traditional consultative institution and forum wherein issues of 
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In developed as well as in developing countries, people face a wide variety of risks to their 
livelihood. Natural as well as man-made disasters have great potential to inflict human, economic 
and physical losses. For example, armed conflict or civil wars as man-made disasters result in three 
times as many deaths as inter-state wars between states since world war11 (Fearon and Laitin 2003 
cited in Justino 2009). They have caused displacement of 20 to 25 millions of people in their own 
countries throughout the world (UN-HABITAT, 2004). Collier (1999) estimated that in Africa the 
average civil war reduces national GDP by around to 2.2 percent per annum. Similarly, in recent 
history the world has experienced devastating natural disasters in the form of 2004 Asian Tsunami, 
2005 Pakistan Earthquake, 2005 Katrina Hurricane etc. These and others natural disasters brought 
serious negative consequences in term of human, economic and physical losses. For example, 2005 
earthquake resulted in death of 73000 and rendered 2.8 homeless in Northern Pakistan (ADB and 
WB, 2005) 
Man-made and natural disasters always have serious implications for livelihoods of the people 
affected. Some of the more common types of shocks that conflict brings include: interrupting food 
access or production, restricting access to agricultural or grazing land, restricting access to water 
and other natural resources. It also causes the labor market to collapse, preventing markets from 
operating, causing price spikes, or destroying or blocking market and trade routes, disrupting 
banking systems and government services, either as a result of capacity failure or deliberate action. 
Moreover, conflict frequently result in displacing civilians , stripping, burning or looting assets of 
marginalized or targeted groups, destroying infrastructure, encouraging or enabling sexual violence 
against women and girls, sabotaging ongoing development projects and deprive people of 
employment in these projects, as well as altering gender roles such that the vulnerability of the 
household is increased (USAID 2005 ; Hammond & Boudreau 2007).   
People affected by conflict have two overriding concerns: surviving the immediate physical threats 
and overcoming long-term threats to their livelihoods (FIFC 2004). Whether the disruption to 
livelihoods is quick or protracted, households respond by adapting strategies to ensure the survival 
of the household (Young et. al. 2001; Jaspers and Shoham 2002). Households often show 
remarkable resilience and, even in extremely acute situations, pursue a strategy of balancing short 
term needs with longer term survival concerns (De Waal 1989; Lautze 1997). While livelihood 
strategies change in response to shifts in a household's access to assets, their effectiveness depends 
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on many external factors. Policies and institutions, both formal and informal, are powerful forces 
that either help or hinder access to assets. These include systems of governance, gender roles, owner 
ship systems, religious doctrine, and cultural mores (Lautze 1997; FIFC 2004).  
1.1 Study Background  
 Pakistan has been vulnerable to both man-made and natural disasters. Since independence, Pakistan 
fought three wars against India. There have been internal armed conflicts and disturbances for many 
years. These took place between Sunni and Shia Muslim; between the military and armed groups 
seeking autonomy in the province of Baluchistan. For the last decade, Pakistan has faced severe 
internal conflict in the form of terrorism in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa1 (KP) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This conflict caused severe human and economic losses. This is 
clear from the fact that 5000 people lost their lives and 10000 were injured between 2007 and 2008 
(IPRI 2008). According to official estimates, Pakistan has suffered a loss of around $ 35-40 billion 
since 2001 (Ali 2010). 
Pakistan is also extremely vulnerable to natural disasters due to its geographical location. These 
disasters are mainly in the form of floods, earthquakes, drought, cyclones, storms, landslides etc. 
Historically floods are the most frequently occurring disasters and have caused tremendous damage 
to livelihood and infrastructure, with severe implications for livelihood security. In August 2010 
floods in Indus River affected more than 20 million people, (over one-tenth of Pakistan's 
population) with over 1,980 reported deaths and nearly 2,946 injured. About 1.6 million homes have 
been destroyed, and thousands of acres of crops and agricultural lands have been damaged with 
major soil erosion happening in some areas (World Bank 2010). 
Swat is one of the areas which also have been affected by armed conflict between Pakistan army 
and the Taliban2 in 2009 and later on in August 2010 floods. The armed conflict caused 
displacement of 2 million people from Swat. The majority of these displaced families took refuge in 
host communities and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps in Mardan and Swabi district 
(CPPR 2010) 
                                                          
1 From 2010, the province was renamed from North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” 
2 In literature different names have been used for the Taliban in Pakistan. For example, Tehrik-i-    Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), Pakistan Taliban Moment (PTM), terrorist, islamic militant and extremist. In this case study, Taliban refers to 
the followers of swat based Tehrik-i-Nifaaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) headed by Sufi Muhammad and later on  
merged in to  Tehrik-i-Taliban, Pakistan (TTP) under the leadership of Maulana Fazllullah (for detail see chapter 4) 
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Swat Valley is located approximately 160 kilometers northwest of Islamabad, the capital of 
Pakistan. The main sources of people’s income are farming, remittances, tourism, trade and daily 
waging and services. Farming accounts for roughly 50% of the economic activities of the Swat 
district and is the major source of income for much of the rural population (CPPR 2010). Swat is 
famous for fruit and vegetable productions. According to Agricultural Statistics 2007-2008, Swat 
district produces 32% (vegetables) and 34% fruit of total production of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) 
Province. Due to the armed conflict total loss to the farming sector range from Rs. 19 billion to 22 
billion has been estimated (Zahid 2010). Swat is also famous for tourism. There are 850 hotels and 
restaurants in which 15000 people were directly employed in terms of hotels owners and servants 
while 25000 were indirect employed in terms of suppliers and other business. This sector incurred a 
loss of 7.5 billion rupees in armed conflict (Zahid 2010). Apart from farming and tourism, silk and 
cosmetic manufacturing units were also provided employment opportunities for thousands of local 
people before the war but according to the Directorate of Industries, Commerce and labor, several 
industrial units were closed or shifted from the areas due to insecurity situations. In 2006 there were 
290 industrial units in the area which were reduced to 150 in 2009, rendering thousands of workers 
unemployed (CPPR 2010). According to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
preliminary damages and needs assessment report in 2009, the industrial sector incurred a loss of 
153.38 million rupees.  According to a Save the Children’s (2009) rapid assessment report, 
household livelihoods were severely affected by the conflict, causing a decline in incomes. The 
average household income is estimated to have declined from Rs. 37,903 per month (or US $457) to 
Rs. 10,198 per month (or US $123) – a fall of 73 percent. 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
This study has been conducted in Matta area of Swat district, Pakistan. This area were a strong hold 
of Taliban and therefore deeply affected by Pakistan army’s military operation against Taliban in 
June 2009. The main reason behind this was that it share borders with Dir district which also 
remained a strong hold of the Taliban. Furthermore, the main training center of the Taliban was in 
the border area of Matta and Dir District. This armed conflict imposed a significant cost on villagers 
in term of human, physical and economic losses. The villagers were forced to leave their villages 
and became IDPs in other parts of the country for four months. The people returned to their homes 
after four months when government forces controlled the area in September 2009. The situation was 
further exacerbated in the August 2010 floods in area by washing away the fertile land covering the 
11 
 
fruit orchards and vegetable crops. After the wars and the floods people living in these villages are 
trying to restore their destroyed assets and revive their livelihoods. Several governmental and non-
governmental organizations (International and National) are providing assistance to the people 
rebuild to their livelihood. 
Given this experience, this study seeks to investigate how the 24 case households responded to these 
multiple shocks and with what effects for their livelihood security 
1.3. Thesis Objectives and Research Questions  
Thesis Objectives  
The main objective of this thesis is to explore household livelihood trajectories in the context of 
man-made and natural disasters in three selected villages of district Swat, Pakistan. This will be 
achieved by investigating the following aspects: 
• Examining the impacts of the armed conflict and floods on livelihoods of the study 
households and assessing the later capacity to cope and recover 
• Assessing the contribution of governmental and non-governmental organization in 
supporting the recovery of livelihood of the conflict and floods  affected households  
 Research Questions  
The following questions will be explored to address the above mentioned objectives 
• What have been the livelihood trajectories and welfare outcomes of the study households in 
the context of armed conflict and floods? How are these differentiated by socio economic 
position, community and context? 
• What did the studied households do before the armed conflict and floods to gain their 
livelihoods? How these practices were affected by the crises? And what were the effects on 
the livelihood outcomes and the implications for the welfare of the studied households? 
• What kinds of governmental and non-governmental organizations were working in the 





1.4. Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The second chapter develops the conceptual framework for 
the study, focusing on households, livelihoods and livelihoods security, coping strategies, 
vulnerability and risk and the livelihoods intervention in the emergency situation. The third chapter 
outlines the methodology. The fourth chapter presents the historical background of the armed 
conflict in the case study area. The fifth chapter describes the context of the villages and the effect 
of the armed conflict as well floods. The sixth chapter presents the case evidence of livelihood 
change, exploring patterns of coping and decline in the face of crises situations. The seventh chapter 
explores the effect of livelihood interventions of governmental and NGOs on the livelihood 














Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
This thesis engages with several concepts and theoretical frameworks to explore the research 
questions presented in the first chapter. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
presents the key concepts of household, livelihoods, livelihood security and coping strategies. The 
second section will discuss vulnerability and risk. The third section discusses livelihood trajectories 
approach. The fourth section discusses interventions in emergencies.  
2.1 Key Concepts and Terms 
Household   
This study has used ‘household’ as a unit of analysis. In spite of the fact that the phenomenon of 
‘household’ is universal; there is no single standard definition for it. Defining the household 
represents an intractable theoretical problem (Messer 1983 cited in Mula 1999).  Conventionally, 
the household is defined as a social group, which resides in the same place, shares the same meals, 
and makes joint or coordinated decisions over resource allocation and income pooling (Meillassous 
1981, Ellis 1993 cited in Ellis 2000). This definition emphasizes co-residence as the key attribute of 
the household. However, the household as a social unit may sometimes have non-family members 
permanently in the residence. The alternative conception of the household place less emphasis on 
co-residence and recognize the role of non-resident family members in contributing to the wellbeing 
of the resident group (ibid). It has been argued that due to the importance of the kinship networks 
for household survival the family rather than the household is the appropriate social unit for 
livelihood research (Rruce and Lloyed 1997 cited in Ellis 2000). However, the social networks that 
are fostered by livelihood for livelihood security purposes may often be based on village ethnicity 
and other social ties that are not explicitly familial in content (Ellis 2000). Baber (1998) in his 
research in rural South Africa, utilizes four overlapping definitions of social units i.e. homestead 
units, family groups, co-resident units, and mutual support units. Homestead unit is the broadest 
social grouping which includes all the individuals who belongs to a particular rural homestead in the 
sense that they have the right to be based there and participate as full members of the grouping. 
Family groups are the sub-units of the homestead held together by bonds between individuals which 
are stronger than those with other groups within the homestead, for example, nuclear families. The 
co-resident unit comprised of all those living in the homestead on daily basis. The mutual support 
unit consists of the co-resident unit plus migrants who remit on a regular basis. According to Baber 
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(1998) “the kinship composition of the homestead is mapped to the spatial nature of its livelihood 
sources, yielding four main combinations i.e. simple-resident (one family group, no migrants), 
simple dispersed (one family group, migrants) extended resident (multiple family groups, no 
migrants), and extended-dispersed (multiple family groups, migrants)” (Ellis 2000). It is clear from 
above discussion that ‘household’ means different things to different people in different places 
Within the local context of this case study area, the term ‘family’ is used for the nuclear family. A 
household may be comprised of one or more nuclear families living together and sharing income 
and expenditure with the inclusion of migrant members who make intermittent or regular 
contribution to household welfare where applicable (Baber 1998).  
Livelihoods 
In dictionaries, the word ‘livelihoods’ is frequently equated with the means of supporting human life 
(Merriam Webster Dictionary) or a means of living (Oxford Dictionary). The livelihood concept, 
however, covers more than that.  A livelihood “comprises the assets (natural, human, financial, and 
social capital), the activities and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) 
that together determine the living gained by the individual or household” (Ellis 2000, p.10). A 
livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain its 
capability and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation 
(Chambers & Convey 1992). However, not all households are equal in their ability to cope with 
stresses and repeated shocks. Maxwell and Smith (1992) argued that poor people balance competing 
needs for asset preservation, income generation and present and future food supplies in complex 
ways 
 Household Livelihood Security  
The concept of household livelihood security was developed from the issues related to household 
food and nutritional security.  It was found that food security is but one subset of objectives of poor 
households; food security is only one of a whole range of factors that determine why the poor take 
decisions and spread risk, and how they finely balance competing interests in order to subsist in the 
short and longer term (Maxwell and Smith 1992). Food is understood to be only one of the priorities 
that people pursue. People are constantly required to balance food procurement against the 
satisfaction of other basic material and non-material needs (Maxwell and Frankenberger 1992). 
Household livelihood security is “defined as adequate and sustainable access to income and 
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resources to meet basic needs (including adequate access to food, potable water, health facilities, 
educational opportunities, housing, time for community participation and social integration”. The 
risk of livelihood failure determines the level of vulnerability of a household to income, food, health 
and nutritional insecurity. Therefore, livelihoods are secure when households have secure ownership 
of, or access to, resources and income earning activities, including reserves and assets, to offset 
risks, ease shocks and meet contingencies (Chambers 1989). 
 Coping Strategies  
Coping strategies are temporary responses employed by households in an effort to adjust or 
compensate for shock. Coping comprises tactics for maintaining consumption when confronted by 
disaster, such as drawing down on savings, using up food stocks, gifts from relatives, community 
transfers, migration, sales of livestock, sale or abandonment of fixed assets such as land, houses and 
so on (Ellis 2000, p. 62) 
In the context of conflict, coping strategies could be seen as temporary responses to threat to lives, 
livelihoods and security, and may fluctuate over time (Jaspers et al 2007). The coping strategies can 
be divided into reversible and irreversible. The reversible coping strategies are those that do not 
cause permanent damage to livelihoods, for example, intensification or diversification of existing 
livelihood strategies (Scoones 1998). Unlike reversible, the irreversible coping strategies cause 
permanent damages, for instance, sale of productive assets, migration of whole families after 
destitutions (Corbbet 1988 ). Devereux (1999) terms irreversible strategies as survival strategies, as 
they actually reflect an inability to cope. 
Strategies to protect livelihoods in conflict are often more limited than those employed in natural 
disasters. In conflict, people may be actively prevented in pursuing coping strategies: when assets 
are stolen or destroyed, labor opportunities are denied or food is withheld (de Wall 1989) 
2.2 Risk and Vulnerability 
In the last two decades, vulnerability received much attention and concerns with the situation of 
poverty faced by households not just today but also in future. The static view of poverty tended to 
provide snapshots of households in single point in time that failed to capture the dynamic forces 
influencing the livelihood security (Kantor & Pain 2011). The vulnerability concept is complex and 
capturing socio economic changes overtime rather than taking it with in specific time and defined as 
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exposure to risk of being or becoming poor (P. Glewwe and G. Hall 1995; Niala Kabeer 2002 cited 
in Kantor & Pain 2011).   
Vulnerability is inextricably linked to risks and shocks. The occurrence of a shock has two types of 
impacts. The first is internal defenselessness that results from reduced resources and the second is 
external defenselessness that results from a fragile environment. Internal defenselessness results 
from idiosyncratic capacities, which are specific to households and individuals and determine how 
the impact of the shock is internalized. External defenselessness is the result of new risks that 
emerge in the environment surrounding the household after the conflict (Ahmed 2010) 
 
 An integral part of vulnerability, different institutions, academics and policy makers have defined 
risk in various ways. Risk can be defined as the probability of a loss happening (Kantor & Pain 
2011); or it may be expectation of losses (physical, economic etc.) in the future ((Alwang et al  2001 
cited in Ahmed 2010). While the first measures the probability of an event occurring, the latter 
measures, to an extent, the impact of that event i.e. the cost in terms of damages and losses incurred 
(Ahmed 2010).  Households and individual vary in their capacities to respond to risk, leading to 
different livelihood outcomes (Kantor & Pain 2011). There are varieties of risk which individuals or 
households face, some of which affect well being more directly than others (Dercon 2000).  Those 
risks which results in a fall of household income is called damaging fluctuations (Sinha and Lipton 
1999). Sinha and Lipton identified six types of risks that cause damaging fluctuations. That included 
risks resulting from violence, natural disasters, harvest and seasonality, health, labor markets and 
price fluctuations. Existence of risks in itself can have a negative impact on household well-being 
because it prompts risk adverse behavior that forces households to invest in low risk; low returns 
activities (Norton et al 2001) 
 
Shocks are sudden events that have the potential to impact livelihood security (Rahn 1996 citing in 
Ahmed 2010). Shocks occurs when risk manifest into events. They affect different group of people 
in different ways, depending upon existing level of well-being: the poorer the individual or 
household, the more negative potential impact of shock (Ahmed 2010). 
Risk and vulnerability depend on the nature of shock and the coping strategies of a household. In 
some cases, people who have assets are more vulnerable than those who do not. For example, in 
armed conflict assets can be turned into life-threatening liabilities (Lautaz and Raven Roberts 2006). 
For example owning cattle or receiving remittances in an IDP camp may bolster resilience, but 
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having access to these also increases likelihood of being targeted. Assets ownership can therefore be 
a key determinant in vulnerability. 
 
Vulnerability and risk are more complicated in the context of armed conflict than in emergencies 
brought on by economic crises and natural disasters. In armed conflict, the conflicting groups often 
intentionally destroy and/or exploit civilians and civilian’s livelihood (de Waal 1993; Lautze 1997; 
Pain and Lautze 2002). Physical insecurity can render transport difficult or risky thereby affecting 
the trade and can hinder or halt agricultural production at both subsistence and the national levels 
which can be result in to livelihood insecurity in the affected area. 
2.3 Livelihood Trajectory Approach: 
This study used a ‘Livelihood Trajectory’ approach to explore how and why some study households 
were able to cope and maintain their livelihood security while majority of them experienced an 
erosion of their livelihood security. A livelihood trajectory approach allows the examination of an 
individual household’s “strategic behavior that is embedded in a historical repertoire, in social 
differentiation” (de Haan and Zoomers 2005), and in perceptions of risk. Bagchi et al. (1998) use 
the term “livelihood trajectories” to describe and explain the direction and pattern of livelihoods of 
individuals or groups of people (e.g., households). According to de Haans and Zoomers (2005) the 
livelihood trajectory approach make use of life histories that allows a deeper penetration into the 
beliefs, needs, aspirations, and limitations of people’s lives, but it is also contextualized in relation 
to power and institutions. An increasingly important application of the livelihood trajectory 
approach is in exploring the shocks and stresses that can affect livelihoods. The livelihood trajectory 
approach represents a dynamic standpoint on livelihoods, which takes into account success and 
failure (ibid). 
2.4 Livelihoods Interventions in Emergencies 
In any emergency, a variety of livelihoods interventions are possible, depending on the type of 
livelihoods affected and the nature of the risks facing different populations groups (Jaspars et al 
2007). In general, the livelihood interventions are those that support the assets the people need to 
carry out their livelihood strategies and to support policies, process and institutions (Lautze and 
Stites 2003; Young et al 2007 ). 
18 
 
Food aid is always major component of humanitarian assistance. But now humanitarian agencies are 
increasingly using a variety of livelihoods interventions in both conflict situations and natural 
disasters, for example, income and cash transfers (grants, vouchers, and cash for work) (Harvey 
2007). Provision of agricultural inputs is also the most common livelihood support intervention.  
The livelihood interventions are loosely categorized into three overlapping phases that roughly 
correspond to immediate, short and long term needs of the affected populations. These three phases 
are livelihood provisioning, livelihood protection and livelihood promotion. 













Livelihood provisioning  
Livelihood provisioning is a set of relief based interventions that involve providing food and 
meeting other essential needs for households to maintain nutritional level and save lives. 
Interventions of this type usually entail food and health relief for people in an emergency or people 
who are chronically vulnerable. 
Livelihood protection 
Livelihood protection is a set of interventions that involve protecting household livelihood systems 
to prevent an erosion of productive assets and replacing or rebuilding productive assets. These 
types of interventions entail timely food and income transfers; infrastructure repair, rehabilitation, 
and improvements, carried out through food- or cash for-work or some other means; and 
replacement of assets such as tools, boats and seeds. 
 
Livelihood promotion 
Livelihood promotion is a set of development based interventions that involve improving the 
resilience of household livelihoods so that food and other basic needs can be met on a sustainable 
basis Interventions of this type entail strategies such as diversifying livelihoods strategies; creating 
alternative income-generating activities; providing financial services, such as loans and insurance; 
and strengthening markets. Interventions of this type entail strategies such as diversifying 
livelihoods strategies; creating alternative income-generating activities; providing financial 
services, such as loans and insurance; and strengthening markets.  
 





Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section describes the research approach and a brief 
description of the study villages and case households. The second section describes the tools used 
for data collection. The third section is about ethical issues faced during the field work 
3.1 Research Approach 
A qualitative Study 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the household’s livelihoods trajectories in the context 
of armed conflict between the Taliban and Pakistan army and the 2010 floods in three selected 
villages of Matta area of Swat district, Pakistan. This research focuses on an in depth qualitative 
analysis of selected case studies and generating conclusion from them. The tools used for data 
collection were household interviews, key informants interviews, focus group discussion and 
participant observations 
Selection of the Villages Studied  
The field work covers three villages in Matta area of Swat district. These three villages were 
selected because they were among the strong holds of Taliban and hence deeply affected in the 
armed operations of the Pakistan Army against Taliban in 2009 and later on in 2010 floods. The 
selection was done with the consultation of Literate Masses- a local level NGO providing assistance 
in the area.  
Selection of the Study households 
This study used a purposive sampling technique to select the sample. In purposive sampling, we 
sample with purpose in mind. The power of purposive sampling lies in selecting information rich-
cases for in-depth analysis related to central issues being studies. Therefore, it was an appropriate 
technique to select those households affected in armed conflict and floods 
Wealth ranking exercise has been carried out so that affected household from different wealth 
categories can be identified.  At the start of the exercise, the villagers were asked to define the 
attributes and criteria of rich, medium and poor people in their village. Then they were asked to 
divide the households in the village as per criteria they developed (for detail see Annexure 1).  A 
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total of 24 households, 8 per each village, from rich, medium and poor categories were identified 
and interviewed (See Table 2). All the respondents and village names were kept anonymous due to 
security concerns and specific codes were allotted to each respondent and village   
 The Key Characteristics of the study villages and households 
In Figure 1 red colored area indicates geographical area of Swat district, in which the three study 
villages (A, B, C) are located, Table 1 shows some basics characteristics of the three villages and 
point out some key contrast between them. It shows that village B has more estimated household 
(450) compared to village C (350) and A (150). It also shows the difference among the total arable 
land available to people among the villages. It further shows that Village A relies more on 
remittances and agriculture while village B and C have a diverse income sources including shop 
keeping and business, agriculture, remittances, and daily waging. Village A suffered more in terms 
of human losses and other physical damages compared to B and C. Table 1  shows the size and 
composition of the eight sampled households in each village, listed by wealth group 






Table 1 Basic Characteristics of three villages 
Source: Focus group meetings and Database of  Rural Welfare  Organization and 
Khushobo Community Development Organzations in village B and C  respectively 
* In village B and C majority of the people displaced during armed operation while some remained trapped due to road blockage 






    Village A  Village B Village C 
1 
Distance from Tehsil Header Quarter (in 
Kilometers) 
15 5 18 
3 Total Number of Estimated Households 250 1600 800 













daily waging  
5 Total Estimated Arable Land (in Acres) 150 450 500 
6 Total estimated Irrigated Land (in Acres) 100 240 350 
7 Total estimated rain fed land (In Acres) 50 210 150 
8 Damages in Armed Conflict  
  Houses Partially or Completely Damaged 70 20 35 
  Human Losses 85 25 45 

















S= Single Household (Single household comprised of husband, wife and children and in some cases 
parents and unmarried sisters and brothers) 
J= Joint Household (Joint Households comprised of parents, married sons and their children living 
together and sharing income and expenditure  
Within the local context of this case study area, the term ‘family’ is used for the nuclear family. A 
household may be comprised of one (single household) or more nuclear families (joint household) 
living together and sharing income and expenditure with the inclusion of migrant members who 








 Village C  
households 
1 
A1 (28, J) B1 (34, J) C1 (24, J) 
A2 (23 J) B2 (10, S) C2 (34, J) 
11 
A3 (25,J) B3 (20, J) C3 (14, J) 
A4 (17, J) B4 (10, S) C4 (11, S) 
A5 (14,J) B5 (10,S) C5 (8, S) 
111 
A6 (8, S) B6 (16, J) C6 (11, J ) 
A7 (9, S) B7  (7, S) C8 (13, J) 
A8 (8,S) B8 (11, S) C9 (8, S) 
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2.2 Data Collection 
Primary Data Collection 
The field data were collected in four weeks from April 25 to 25 May, 2011. With help of a local 
organization working in the area, an introductory visit in the first week of April was carried out to 
gain some familiarity with area and the villagers. Three different interviews guides were used for 
household, focus group discussion and key informant interviews. Three group discussions were 
conducted, one in each selected village. Seven key informant interviews with village elders and 
personnel of NGOs and government organizations were also carried out. 
  (a) Household Interviews 
A total of 24 household interviews were conducted, 8 in each three villages. For household 
interviews a detailed interview guide were used. It identified key themes: household basic 
information, household composition and structure, household history, income sources and assets, 
changes in household assets after armed conflict, land and agricultural production, livestock 
holding, off farm income sources, non farm income sources, migration and remittances, social 
networks and connections, links with NGOs, governmental organization, informal system and the 
wider context. In majority cases household interviews were carried with the male household heads 
but in some cases interviews were conducted with other members of household due to the absence 
of the household head. Due to culture constraints in the study area, the researcher was not able to 
conduct interview with female members of the households that could improve the quality of field 
data by providing a balance view of the study household situation  
(b)Focus Group Discussion  
Three (3) group discussions with the head of the households were held prior to household interviews 
and key informant interview, one in each three villages. A separate interview guide was used having 
key themes: village demographics, history, infrastructure and services, land and agricultural 
production, livestock holding, income sources, off farm income sources, non farm income sources, 
migration and remittances, social networks and connection, links with governmental, NGOs and 
informal system. Focus group discussion is a useful qualitative research technique because it is cost 
effective in term of time and resources; it brings a sum of knowledge greater than  any individual 
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insight and it  provides opportunity for triangulation of information collected in individual and key 
informant interviews (Roche 1999 cited in Randel 2006 ). 
   
 (c) Key Informant Interviews 
    NGOs and government organization’s Personnel  
Four interviews were conducted with personnel of three NGOs and one government organization 
actively involved in providing relief assistance in both crises. The main purpose of these interviews 
was to get information about the type of relief assistance they have provided/are providing to 
affected people in the study villages. A separate interview guide was used for this purpose. These 
interviews were conducted with personnel of Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA), 
Save the Children (US), Literate Masses and Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 
(ACTED), 
   Village Elders 
Three interviews with village elders one in each village were conducted. The main purpose of these 
interviews was to get information of the key events that had taken place in the village. It also aimed 
to get information about agricultural production, off farm and non farm income sources, migration 
trends, the assistance of NGOs, government organization and informal sources aftermath of armed 
conflict and flood. It was also helpful in providing information about the social structure of the 
village. 
(d) Participant Observation 
Participant observation is an important qualitative research method with roots in traditional 
ethnographic research whose objective is to help researchers learn the perspectives held by study 
populations (Family Health International 2005). During field work, the researcher spent three weeks 
in his field area with villagers and it gives him an opportunity to note people’s behavior about the 
past and present situation of the area. It has been noted that people are still pessimistic about the 




“We are very confused about the future of our area. Now the security situation is very good 
due to the presence of Pakistan Army but once they withdraw from the area, Taliban can 
reappear.”  
It has also been noted that still there is lack of trust among the people because they are making 
complain against each other to the Pakistan Army of being involved in anti – government activities. 
For example, Taliban killed five members of Malak family in village A. They thought that villagers 
did not help them against Taliban and started to complain to the army of the villagers supporting the 
Taliban. As a result many villagers were captured and killed at the end of the army operation3. 
 Secondary Data 
Literature and data relevant to study objectives were collected from different sources. Books and 
journals and other literature including reports from International Non Governmental Organizations 
and the United Nation were used. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (www.internal-
displacement.org) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (www.odi.org) have been utilized. 
Online reports of Provincial government and NGOs about damages and need assessments of armed 
conflict and floods were also used. Reports of different NGOs and Donor organization regarding 
household livelihood in the context of armed conflict were also used for theoretical guidance.  
3.3 Research Ethics 
When it comes to discussion about ethics in social research there are four issues formulated by 
Diener and Crandall (1978); whether there is harm to participants, whether there is a lack of 
informed consent, whether there is an invasion of privacy and whether deception is involved 
(Diener and Crandall 1978 ceted in Bryman 2004).  
The research on household’s livelihood trajectories in the context of armed conflict and floods 
disasters was conducted considering the above mentioned ethical issues. Informed consent is a 
critical component in ethical research which uses human participants. Informed consent is a 
mechanism for ensuring that people understand what it means to participate in a particular research 
study so they can decide in a conscious, deliberate way whether they want to participate. Informed 
                                                          




consent is one of the most important tools for ensuring respect for persons during research. During 
my field work the researcher always introduced himself as a student, the  purpose of the research 
and then the participants were asked verbally for their willingness to participate in the interview or 
not.  Privacy and confidentiality of the respondents was given high priority during the whole period 
of field work. It was noted that there is still lack of trust among the villagers. The villagers made 
complaints against each other to the army for being involved in anti government activities. Initially 
it was found that some respondents feel hesitation to talk with me and these respondents didn’t want 
to disclose their names because of security reasons. Therefore, specific codes were allotted to each 
respondents and villages so to keep their privacy and confidentiality. The issue of deception which 
means when researchers represent their research as something other than what it is (Bryman 2004: 
514). This issue was tackle by explaining that the researcher is studying in Sweden and came here to 
know the impacts of armed conflict and floods on the livelihoods of people at the start of interviews. 
The researcher always took verbal consent for audio or video recording of participants. It was 
highly sensitive in the research area because participants were reluctant to expose themselves 
because of the fear of Pakistan army which is constantly in search of the pro militants. Some of 
respondents refused to give photographs during interviews which were respected by researcher. 
There is always danger of raising expectation of people during research (Pratt and Lozios 1992).  As 
the researcher made initial contacts in the villages through Literate Mass – a local organization 
working in the area, therefore initially the villagers took me as a NGO worker and were expecting 
some support from me. It is clear from the fact that on the first day of my visit in one of selected 
village, many villagers surrounded me and asking the purpose of my visit. Many of them quickly 
dispersed when I told them the purpose of my visit. So the researcher always tried to minimize the 





Chapter 4: Swat District and Context 
The previous chapter discussed the methodology employed for conducting the study. This chapter 
provides an overview of District Swat. It also discusses the causes which contributed to the 
emergence of Taliban in the District. A brief description of displacement of the people during armed 
conflict will be presented. Furthermore, it also discusses how the August. 2010 floods added to the 
people problems already affected with armed conflict. 
The District of Swat is part of the Malakand Division in the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), 
Pakistan. It is located approximately 160 kilometers northwest of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. 
In 1967, the autonomous state of Swat merged into Pakistan and were given the status of District 
4.1. Background of Swat Conflict 
In the early 20th century swat was mostly ruled by religious leaders. The Islamic state of Swat was 
first established in 1849 rule under Shariah law4 (Aziz 2010). However there was conflict with 
bordering state of Dir and the area remained disturbed from 1863 to 1915. In 1915 Syed Abudl 
Jabbar Khan was appointed the ruler by a local Jirga but had trouble exercising power. In 1917 
another Jarga made Miangul Abdul Wadud as the new ruler. The British recognized the state in 
1926 (Aziz 2010). In 1949, Mian Gul Abdul Wadud hands over the reins of the state to his son, 
Miangul Jahanzaib. This era is often viewed as the golden period in the history of swat. Schools, 
hospitals, roads and communication systems were constructed under that era and there was 
generally peace and order in the valley (Khattak 2010). However, after the merger of state with 
Pakistan in 1969, there was little further development in the valley. The justice system, in which 
civil and criminal case alike were delayed for years, caused frustration in the people. When the 
Taliban came to power in Afghanistan, many Swatis were generally supportive, having viewed the 
Taliban as freedom fighters against the Soviets. This residual support for the Taliban in Afghanistan 
among the people of Swat Valley partially contributed to the rise of Sufi Muhammad (ibid) 
Sufi Mohammad 
Sign of trouble first appeared in Swat when radical the cleric Sufi Muhammad started Tehrik Nifaz-
e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM, or Movement for implementation of Sharia of Muhammad) in 
                                                          




1989 (3). In early 1990’s, Sufi Muhammad and his followers began relatively a peaceful campaign 
in favor of implementing Sharia law in the Swat valley, but gradually the movement become more 
militants. Sufi Mohammad and his followers started blockading in wake being unresponsive of the 
Pakistani government towards their demands. Eleven people were killed on May 1994, in clashes 
with security forces (Sultan-i- Rome 2010). The uprising ended in 1994 when the provincial 
government promulgated ‘Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Regulation but it did not satisfy 
TNSM. The organization continued their struggle which resulted in promulgation of Nizam-i-Adl 
Regulation 1999, meaning “the implementation of justice-based system” which authorized Sharia in 
Malakand including Swat (Khattak 2010). The TNSM armed uprising was ceased after the 
agreement. The US invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 terrorist attack brought Sufi Muhammad into 
a renewed position of power, and he led tribal militia, laskhar, of some 10,000 volunteers from Swat 
and the surrounding tribal areas to fight US forces in Afghanistan (Sardar 2009) The people of Swat 
and Dir were not happy with Sufi Muhammad for leading their relatives into Afghanistan war and 
held him responsible for the death of their relatives. Pakistani government arrested Sufi Mohammad 
and banned the TSNM  
 
Maulana Fazlullah 
Sufi Muhammad’s arrest in 2001, left a vacuum in Swat militant movement. Sufi Muhammad so-in- 
law, who had fought with him in Afghanistan and spent 17 months in jail upon his return started 
preaching in a small mosque in Imam Dehri of Swat. At the start, he taught the Quran to children. 
Then he established 30 illegal radio stations through which he broadcast his teaching (Khattak 
2010). He slowly and gradually earned support in the area. The people started donations and women 
of the valley even donated their jewelry. As his support grew, he started discouraging parents from 
sending their girls to school. He also spoke out against watching television and listening to music. 
He also started a campaign against polio vaccinations, which he called “a conspiracy of Jews and 
Christians to stunt the population of Muslims” (ibid)   
Fazlullah also promised social justice for the people of Swat. Swatis, already fed up with inefficient 
judicial system, saw a ray of hope for revival in Fazlillah’s speeches. He promised social parity, 
quick justice, and redistribution of property (Khattak 2010). The promise of land distribution 
attracted many people to his moment throughout Swat, which started capturing orchards, farms and 
other land from Khans, local leaders and landowners who had fled from the area in late 2008 after 
Fazlullah’s men carried out several target killings against them. Initially, the people of Swat 
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provided moral support to Fazlullah but later on some of them took arms after being inspired by his 
sermons and many of these recruits were poor, illiterate and employed youth (ibid).  In July 2007, 
Fazllullah declared jihad5 against the Pakistani army in retaliation for its operation in Red Mosque6 
in Islamabad (Zafar 2011). Nevertheless, by the fall the 2007 Fazalullah had gained administrative 
control of Swat, setting up Islamic courts and attacking girls’ schools. This was an alarming 
development for Pakistani government and so it started the military operation Rah-e-Haq.  
Operation Rah-e-Haq (Just Path) 
 
In November 2007, The Pakistan Army launched the first phase of operation Rahe-e Haq to 
dislodge Fazlullah and his men from the area. The Taliban vacated all the government buildings, 
police stations and other public places they had occupied and by the end of December had retreated 
into mountains (Amin 2007 ) 
 
The Taliban continued their activities from the mountainous area, until the spring of 2008, when 
newly elected provincial government, led by secular Awami National Party (ANP), took office. The 
ANP, a secular Pusthun nationalist party, initiated a dialogue with the Taliban and released Sufi 
Muhammad from jail in April 2008 (BBC 2008). The two sides signed a 16 point agreement on 
May 21, 2008 (Kattak 2008). The essence of the agreement was that the government would 
implement the Islamic law in Swat while the Taliban would cease attacks on security forces and 
would not destroy any more property (ibid ) 
 
 
In June 2008, disagreements were started over the truce terms. Fazlullah insisted that the Pakistani 
government withdraw troops from Swat before he withdrew his fighters while the government 
                                                          
5Jihad has wider meaning and different kinds. Fighting in the way of Allah by means of arms (holy war fought for the 
cause of Islam against the non- Muslims) is one of its kinds and is mentioned as qital in the Holy Qur’an. With the 
overwhelming purposely use of the word jihad for its qital aspect only, its other aspects, kinds and dimensions remains 
hidden from the eyes of majority of the people around the globe 
6From July 3-11, 2007, the government under Pervez Musharraf conducted a military operation against students in Lal 
Masjid and Jamia Hafsa complex in Islamabad. This operation came after various confrontations between authorities 
and militants led by Maulana Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid Gazi. The students were calling for the imposition of an 
Islamic system of governance. The army stormed the complex and the operation resulted in over 100 deaths, including 
those of female madrassa students. Since then, Lal Masjid had become a rallying cry for Islamic militants across 
Pakistan and some believe that it is directly correlated to the increase in suicide bombing 
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wanted Swat Taliban to disarm first. Fazlullah renounced the May 21 agreement and ordered his 
followers to attack Pakistani security forces. The killing of two officers of Inter-Services 
Intelligence Agency (ISI) prompted the army to start a new operation on June 29  (Dawn 2008) 
The second half of 2008 and the first months of 2009 was the worst period in recent history of Swat. 
Scores of schools were destroyed either by Taliban or during military operation, barbers were 
forbidden to shave men’s beard, music was banned and 2 million people fled the area for other parts 
of the country (Waraich 2009 ). The writ of the government was restricted to Mingora while the rest 
of Swat was controlled by Taliban.  
 
The prevailing situation compelled the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa government to enforce the Nizam-i-
Adl Regulation, a new act implementing Sharia in Malakand including Swat district and another 
peace agreement was signed on February 15, 2009 (Khattak 2009). But this agreement also failed as 
the Taliban refused to lay down their arms and abandon the check posts across the valley.  The 
Taliban continued the killing of government official and spread the violence to adjacent areas. They 
killed a district police office in lower Dir and five policemen in Upper Dir (Jan 2009). This 
alarming situation compelled the army to launch another operation 
 
Operation Reh-e-Rasst ( Right Path) 
 
In late April 2009, Pakistan Army started its final and decisive operation Reh-e-Rasst against 
Taliban. Local people were asked beforehand to vacate the area and nearly 2.5 million arrived in 
Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera, Charsadda and other cities to live in camps,  with relatives and host 
families, and in rented houses. The operation resulted in the escape of Maulana Fazllullah and the 
arrest of Sufi Mohammad leaving administrative control of Swat to the army and government. The 
people of Swat returned their home after the Army claimed full control of the valley in late July, 
2009 
4.2. The Humanitarian Response  
 
 United Nations made an appeal of US£ 680.1 million for the relief and rehabilitation of the affected 
people in Swat valley. The international community responded well to the appeal made by UN and 
provided US £ 5.40 million (Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS 2010) 
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Government, UN agencies and several international and NGOs have provided or are providing relief 
and rehabilitation assistance in the form of food aid, shelter and protection, health, water and 
sanitation, compensation for human losses and house damages, restoration of livelihoods etc. 
4.3 The 2010 Floods 
While people were struggling to rehabilitate their livelihoods, the August 2010 devastating floods 
exacerbate the situation by destroying crops, eroding agricultural lands and killing cattle, the main 
income source for many families. According to an official from the ministry of food and agriculture, 
100,000 acres of soil along the Swat River has been washed out; the official estimated it would take 
up to ten years to “restore the fertility of this critical area that feeds 50,000 people (Adam 2010). 
Furthermore, Roads and bridges in the area were swept away (Zafar 2011). According to ACTED 
rapid need assessment of 2010 floods conducted in 173 villages of Swat, 286 people lost their lives, 
9450 house were completely swept away. 
4.4. Conclusion  
The Swat conflict has a long history. The main drivers behind the conflict were inefficient 
governance and judicial system in the area.  This motivated the people to join TNSM and later on 
the Taliban for the implementation of Sharia Law in the area. The government signed a number of 
agreements with TNSM but all in vain due to one reason or another. After a series of operations, the 
Pakistan Army conducted massive operation in May 2009 which resulted in displacement of 2 
million people from the area. The international community responded well to the appeal made by 






Chapter: 5 Description of the Study Villages 
The previous chapter provided an historical background of the conflict in the Swat district. This 
chapter will discuss the socio economic situation of the villages. It also discusses the damages 
caused by conflict as well as floods and assistance provided by the state and NGOs.  
5.1. The Study Villages 
The three study villages are located in Tehsil Matta 54 km distant from the main city of Mingora 
Village A 
Village A is located 14 km away from the Tehsil headquarter Matta town. There are an estimated 
250 households in the village. The village was established around 150 years ago when people from 
different tribes came in search of land. The main qawms7 living in the village are Malakans 
(yousafzai), Miangaan, Parachgan and Gujarans.  
The main income sources of the people are remittances but agriculture and off farm work in the fruit 
picking season also contribute to the income. Migration both national and international remains the 
key livelihood diversification practice of the villagers. Back in 1970’s people started to migrate to 
Middle East in search of work. From the early 1970’s, people also migrated to Karachi in search for 
a better future. Seasonal migration is also common in poorer section of the village. The poor 
migrate annually for two months (from April to May) to Punjab and Azad Kashmir areas in wheat 
cutting season and for six months (from November to March) to Punjab and Sind Provinces for 
working in sugar mills. The village economy is relies on the remittances sent by  household 
members working outside the village as was made clear by the 52 years old household head of A2 
(23,J)  during focus group discussion 
“The majority of households in our village have one or two people who have migrated to the 
Middle East or Karachi for work. The pakka (cemented) houses you are seeing are built by 
the remittances sent by them. I have six brothers and three of them are working in Saudi 
Arabia and they regularly send me money to support our family. 
 
                                                          
7  In Pusthun culture,this is term used for tribe or clan 
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Figure 2 shows a view of village A 
  
  Source: Author 
Agriculture is the second major source of income. Major crops produced are apple, apricot, plums, 
wheat, rice, maize and other vegetables. Since 2007, the income from fruit production was reduced 
due to lack of interest of contractors from other parts of the country because of the insecure situation 
in the village. This indirectly affected off- farm job opportunities for the poorer section of the 
village available in picking season. In 2010, the farmers expected income from their orchards but 
due to floods and tight security restriction imposed by Pakistan Army, they could not market their 
produce. Livestock raring was also common, but only for the household’s daily consumption, 
purpose by supplementing their food with milk, butter, oil etc. It has been found that six out of eight 
respondent households in the village lost or sold their animals at very low prices during the time of 
displacement. 
Village A suffered more in terms of human and physical losses compared to Village B and C during 
the armed operation. At least 85 people lost their lives and seventy houses were burned down. The 
main reason behind this was that the two main Taliban leaders belonged to this village and they 
recruited many people of this village either by force or by willingness. For example, the elder son of 
household A7 which was one of poorest household of the village was captured by the Taliban and 
kept for three months in their private jail. Only later did they release him on the condition to work 
for them. After this he was forced to join the Taliban and disappeared during the armed operations. 
The army burned down his house and kept his father for seven months in a military cell for 
34 
 
investigation.  The village received very little relief assistance from governmental organization and 
NGOs compared to village B and C. The reason for this was given by a participant in FGD: 
“Our village suffered the most during the operation but unfortunately we got very little 
support from the government and NGOs. The reason for this was that the two main Taliban 
leaders belonged to this village. During the army operation the army faced tough resistance 
and lost personnel during the fighting. Due to this the government and the army labeled us as 
pro Taliban. The damaged houses you have observed were burned down by the army in 
retaliation. People who had political connections got compensation for the death of a person 
and their damaged houses but the majorities are still waiting for compensation. For example 
the head of A1 (28, J) is an active member of the ruling political party he used his political 
influence and got compensation for his damaged house. They are ignoring our village. The 
NGOs are reluctant to work in our village because they army has made check posts and they 
do not easily allow outsiders to enter the area” 
Fig 3 shows the house damaged in village A 
 
                      Source: Author 
Village B 
Village B is situated 7 km away from Tehsil headquarter Matta town. It is larger than village A and 
C with an estimated 1600 households. The three main qawms living in the village are Malakans  
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(yousafzai), Miangan and Parachgaan and Engaraan (Black Smith). The village was formed almost 
150 to 180 years ago.  
Village B has a market with around 500 shops. The villagers mainly rely on local business for their 
income. Migration to the Middle East is also common as in village A. The people send money back  
home and invest in business. Seasonal migration also exists but not as much as village A. The local 
market provides work opportunities for the poor like loading and unloading, sales men etc. There is 
unequal distribution of land in village B. It is clear from the fact that 80 out of 250 acres irrigated 
belong to two households of the Malak qawm. It is believed that they captured these lands with help 
of local Patwari8 by giving them bribes. It is clear from the comments made by one of participants 
in a focus group discussion: 
“From the years the Malakans have remained politically very influential in our village. They 
have strong relationships with others influential Khans of the areas. They also have strong 
connections with local administrations and they use them for their own interest. The land they 
owned today is mostly captured from other people with help of local Patwar8.” 
The village had fewer damages in terms of human loss and physical destructions than the other 
villages but the financial losses were more compared to village A and C. All the market was closed 
for 6 months and the goods inside the shops was either looted or spoiled during the displacement. 
The business activities continued but at a very slow pace as the purchasing power was very low due 
to the conflict as described by the 30 years old male member of B (34, J) in interview: 
“Before the conflict we had four shops located at the same place. Our average daily income 
from these shops was around Rs 8000. During the conflict we lost all our four shops because 
they were hit by a missile fired from an aircraft. Now I have only one shop which I started 
with the financial support of retailers. They trust me because of my previous good business 
relations with them. Now, my daily income is only Rs 800 because the purchasing power is 
very low due to the high inflation rate in the country in general and the armed conflict in 
particular.” 
                                                          
8 Patwari is term used for a land record officer at sub-division or Tehsil level 
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Almost 100 acres of orchards and rice fields were also washed away by the floods in Harnoai River 
in August, 2010.  
The village has, however, developed strong connections with both governmental and NGOs 
especially after the armed conflict and the floods compared to village A. The main reason behind 
this is the presence of Rural Welfare Organization (RWO) - a village based organization (VBO) in 
the village. It facilitated the national and international organizations to implement their projects in 
village. Ten governmental and non-governmental organizations have implemented different types of 
projects to support people compared to village A in which only four organizations provided 
assistance. All the respondents in village B received compensation for human losses and house 
damaged while in village A, only 2 out of 8 case households were able to secure compensation. 
Fig 4 A view of Market in village B 
 
                             Source: Author 
Village C 
Village C is located 16 km away from the Tehsil Headquarter Matta town. There are an estimated 
800 households in the village. An estimated 85% households of the village are Yousafzai qawm 
while the remaining 15% comprise of Gujran, Parachgaan, and Miangan.  
The main income sources of the people are agriculture, pitty trade, remittances and daily wages. The 
economy in village C is basically agrarian. It has 500 acres land compared to village A and B, 
which have 150 and 450 acres respectively. It is famous for apple, plum and apricot production. 
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Especially after the introduction of new apple, peach and apricot varieties by the government 
extension department in 1995, the horticulture practices in the village have increased. It is clear 
from the comments made by participants in a focus group discussion: 
“Our village is famous for fruit production in the surrounding areas because we have very 
fertile land and sufficient water is available for our field. Thirty years back our forefathers 
used to cultivate wheat, maize, rice and fodder but there were very few apple gardens because 
it took very long time (at least 25 years) to start the production. But in 1995 the government 
agriculture extension department introduced new varieties of apple, apricot, plums, peach and 
persimmon which can start to produce within three years. As a result 95% of our village is 
covered with these orchards. In a good season, an average apple garden can earn Rs. 
800,000/ acre).”  
Village C has also a small market with around 100 shops which the people started to diversify their 
income sources. Unlike village A and B, international and seasonal migration was very low before 
the armed conflict but it has increased after the army operation against the Taliban and later on after 
the floods in 2010. The main reason behind this was that fruit production which is the main income 
source of 80% of the household was badly affected in the armed conflict and the floods. As stated 
by one of the 35 year male participant of the focus group discussion: 
“Since 2008, we are not getting any income from our orchards. There was frequent curfew 
during 2008 and the orchards contractors were reluctant to purchase the ripe orchards as 
they usually did before. And the people were not able to market their produce due to the 
regular curfew. When army started operation against the Taliban in May 2009, it was the 
peak season and we left all the orchards un-attended as we all became IDPs for four months 
and as result we lost the whole produce.  In 2010 when the security situation improved, all the 
villagers were desperately eying on these orchards for income but unfortunately our village 
received another shock in the form of flooding. Forty five acres of land covered with orchards 
were completely washed away by the devastating floods. And the rest of the produce was not 
marketed due to the destruction of roads and bridges. And now the people start to migrate to 
others parts of the country for work. Unlike before, in this year (2011), poor people went to 
Punjab province for the wheat cutting season to accumulate some wheat stock for the year. 
Many people borrowed money from their relatives and sold their wives jewelry to migrate to 




Fig 5 shows apple orchard in village C 
 
                         Source: Author 
As with village B village C also got more attention in relief activities compared to village A.  Qatar 
Charity, an international NGO, distributed cash Rs. 20,000/shop to fifty four (54) shopkeepers. 
Agriculture inputs including seeds, fruit plants, fertilizers and equipments were also provided by 
PDMA (Provincial Disaster Management Authority). ACTED, French based NGO and Literate 
Masses, a national level NGO implemented Cash for Work (CFW) projects, worth PKRs. 5 and 4 
million respectively. The villagers also received monthly food ration for eight months under the 
World Food Program (WFP). UNHCR provided shelters for people whose houses have been 
completely destroyed. PDMA extended financial support of Rs.300, 000 per dead person and Rs. 
400,000/ house damaged during the armed conflict. An individual philanthropist from India donated 
Rs.6 million for the reconstruction of a Mosque destroyed during the armed conflict. 
Village A received less humanitarian assistance compared to village B and C. The reason behind 
this was strict mobility check imposed by army due to their perception of the village as a Taliban 
supporter. The presence of VCOs in village B and C proved beneficial for the attracting more NGOs 




From the above discussion, it is concluded that all the three study villages varies in their livelihoods 
up to some extent. The economy in village A is mainly based on foreign remittances while village B 
and C were dependent on local business and agriculture respectively. Despite  more human losses 
and physical damages and less assistance received from outside actors, village A found to be more 
resilient (out of 7 coping households 4 belong to village A) due to their dependences on remittances 
sent by the villagers (for more detail see chapter 6). While on the other hand, village B and C 
proved to be more vulnerable (13 out of 17 declining household belong to village B and C) due to 
their high dependences on local resources in the form of local business in village B and agriculture 




Chapter 6: Livelihood Trajectories of the Case Households 
The previous chapter provides a detailed description of three villages. This chapter will explore and 
discuss the livelihood trajectories of the studied households. The main focus is on how and why 
some households were able to cope and maintain their livelihood security while others experienced 
an erosion of their livelihood security.  
This chapter is divided into three sections. This first section is about the coping households. It 
explores the factors responsible for their ability to cope and maintain their livelihood security in the 
context of the armed conflict and floods. The second section is related to declining case households. 
It discusses in detail how and why the majority of the households studied experienced an erosion of 
their livelihood security. The last section summarize the chapter 
6.1. Household’s livelihood Trajectories  
 After the analysis of the study households it was found that out of 24, not a single household was 
able to improve its livelihood security in the aftermath of the armed conflict and floods. Only 7 
were able to cope and maintain their livelihood security while the remaining 17 households 
experienced a decline.  
6.2. Coping Households     
A number of factors contributed to some of the case households being able to cope with and 
maintain their livelihood security. These factors will be discussed one by one in the following 
sections. 
Wealth 
It was found that wealthy households in the study villages bore the brunt of the armed conflict 
financially as well as human and physical losses. They were forced by the Taliban to support them 
financially and when refusing 5 of them lost their lives in village A9. Some of them had to leave the 
village due to the continuous demand of ransom from the Taliban.  For example, the head of 
household A1 (28, J) in village A, was shot dead by refusing ransom to the Taliban. But in spite of 
                                                          




this, A1(28, J) were able to cope with shock on the basis of their previous good economic position. 
As explained by his 35 years old son: 
“Before 2006, our economic condition was very good. Our father was a hard working person. 
In 1988, he went to Saudi Arabia and spent 12 years as a foreman in an oil company and then 
came back to Pakistan in 2000. The money he earned was invested in whole sale medicine 
business in Mingora and Peshawar cities, where four of our household members are working. 
We had also apple and peach orchards on 10 acres, which supplemented our household 
income. My brother was politically very active and was a stern opponent of the Taliban 
ideology. He was an active member of local Jirga and wanted to mobilize the villagers against 
the Taliban but in vain. In retaliation the Taliban killed my father and burned down our house 
and cut down our orchards. Now, we are earning enough money from our business to survive 
but unfortunately we lost our beloved father.” 
The household A1(28,J) suffered both human losses and physical damages but due their business, 
they were able to maintain their livelihood security in both the shocks 
Migration 
Migration to the Middle East for work was also an important factor helping to cope and sustained 
livelihood security of the two households A2 (23, J) and A3(25, J) in village A. Household A2 
(23,J) is living as a joint family and have 23 members in their family. This household suffered from 
both the armed conflict and the floods. In military operation its house was burned by the army and 
they lost all household items3. Two buffalos worth of 200,000 PKRs were also killed. They also 
spent six months as IDPs with relatives in Karachi city. In the 2010 flood, the household lost 2 acres 
shulgari (rice field) which produced 25 mounds of rice enough for the whole year to eat. This 
household was able to sustain their livelihood security due to the remittances sent by their members 
in the Middle East. As explained by the 52 years old male household head. 
“After the death of my father in 1985, as an elder among the brothers I had to quit my 
education and joined merchant navy as a sailor. After 15 years, I left the job and came back to 
my village. In 2003, I paid a visa fee of 250,000 PKRs and sent one of my brothers to Saudi 
Arabia for work. In 2006, when situation became tense in our village, the brother already 
working in Saudi Arabia sent two visas for our two younger brothers and now they are 
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working there for the last 5 years. My youngest brother is driving Diana (a vehicle used for 
the transport of goods) which I bought one year ago and has an average daily net income of 
600 PKRs. We re-constructed our house which cost about 1.2 millions PKRs. The government 
paid us 400,000 PKRs as a compensation for our destroyed house but it was not enough even 
to build a single room. Therefore, I borrowed 500,000 PKRs from one of cousin living in 
Karachi”.  
Though, household  A2 (23, J) has suffered both in the armed conflict as well as in the floods but 
still it was able to cope with situations due to the remittances sent by his brother working abroad. 
Like A2 (23, J), A3 (25, J) also relied on the foreign remittances sent by their 4 members working in 
Dubai. They are running a burger shop in Dubai which they started in 2005. 
 The elder son of the households head recently came back on vacations said: 
“We belong to Parachgaan qawm, which are mostly poor because the majority is landless 
and uneducated. From the years, the main profession of the Parachgaans is to transport 
people goods, agricultural commodities through the help of mules. The villagers paid us in 
kind (wheat, maize, and fruit) in harvesting season on which we had to spend the whole year. 
From the past twenty years the demand of our profession became very low because of road 
construction and now the people mostly use vehicle for transportation of goods. Our 
profession was always risky because of the danger of animal deaths through falling from 
mountains. In 1998, I lost four mules during illegal timber smuggling in Batagram. This 
incidence forced me to leave this profession. Then in 2001, I migrated illegally to Oman for 
work. After one year, I were captured and deported from Oman. In 2004, one of my friends in 
our village sent me a visa from Dubai for which I paid half of the visa fee (100,000 PKRs) and 
the remaining half was paid by my friend (which I paid to him later on). Initially, I worked in 
my friend shop as a sales man but later I opened my own shop and within two years I brought 
my other three brothers when the security situation in our village was bad. The Taliban forced 
the people to join or to support them financially. Therefore our family moved to Karachi in 
2007 and came back to the village in 2010 when the security situation improved”. 
Both A2(23, J) and A3(25, J)  households were able to cope with the both crises due to remittances 




Although, affiliation with political parties proved very dangerous before the army operation as  the 
Taliban mostly targeted those who had prominent political affiliations. However, later on it also 
helped some households to cope with the situation. For example, the head of household B2 (10,  












 1 A1 (28, J) Whole sale medicine business, four  male worker   
1 A2(23,J) Remittances from Middle East sent by three male worker, one member  work as local transporter  
11 A3(25, J) Remittances from Middle East sent by 4 members  






 1 B2 (10, S) Property business in Karachi city  







1 C (34, J) Three salaried members  
 
S) of village B was a government employee in telecommunication department working as a line 
man having a monthly salary of 18,000 PKRs/month. He was also getting 10,000 PKRs/month as a 
rent for his 5 shops in village market. Being an active member of a local political party, he was on 
the hit list of the Taliban in the village. In 2008, he quit his job and migrated to Karachi to save his 
and his family member’s lives. In 2009, he went to Malaysia for work and after passing almost two 
years, then came back to his village and started work as a building contractor. As an active political 
activist of the ruling political party, he used his political connections and got four government 
school building contracts that had been destroyed by the Taliban in his area. During an interview he 
claimed that he is associated with this political party since 20 years back but he did not receive any 
benefit from it. Instead he and his family suffered from the Taliban due to his political affiliation 
with a party which was against them. And now he thinks it is time to cash the opportunity and take 
some benefits from it.    
Government/Salaried Jobs  
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Having a number of government salaried members also played a positive role in maintaining 
livelihood security for two case households. Households A4 (17, J) in village A and C1 (24, J) in 
village C have members with permanent jobs in the education department. For examples, household 
A4(17, J) is the most educated family in village A. The A4 (17, J) household head is a retired Head 
Master of the village high school for boys. All his four sons are well educated. His two elder sons 
are teaching in the village’s high school while his younger son is doing job in the National Database 
and Registration Authority (NADRA) as an accountant. His youngest son is in the final year of civil 
engineering. Household A4 (17, J) is getting a regular income of 55,000 PKRs/month from salaries 
and pension. During the armed conflict, A4 (17, J) house and their household items were completely 
damaged by the army and later on they received 400,000 PKRs from PMDA as a compensation.  
The two oldest sons have also withdrawn 300,000 PKRs from their provident fund10 to rebuild their 
destroyed house. 
Household C1 (24, J) in village C was also able to maintain livelihood security due to its three 
salaried members in education as well as in the banking sector. Two of their members are teachers 
in a government boy’s primary school in the village while the elder member is working as a branch 
manager in the National Bank of Pakistan situated in Matta Town. This brings a permanent income 
of 75000 PKRs /months to the household.  They have also 8 acres of apple and peach orchards but 
they are not getting any income from these during the past three years due to the armed conflict and 
floods. The house and hujra11 of C1(24, J) were completely destroyed during the air bombardment 
in October, 2008. Although, they received compensation 400,000 PKRs for its house from PMDA, 
they have yet not started the reconstruction. Therefore, they took a loan of 1000,000 PKRs from a 
bank by mortgaging their land to rebuild their house. 
6.3. Declining Households  
Out of 24, 17 households experienced a decline in their livelihood security. Out of these 17 
households, 7 belong to village C, 6 to village B and 4 to village A. The key features of these 
declining households are;  low or no diversification of income sources, death or injuries/illness of 
the working members in conflict, less numbers of working people, low economic background etc. 
                                                          
10 A fund into which the employer and the employee both pay money regularly, so that when the employee retires, 
leaves the company, he or she receives a sum of money.  The employee can withdraw a portion of the saved money 
at the time of his service after a specific period ( Longman Business English Dictionary) 




Low or lack of income diversification is one of the key features of declining households. The 
households that mostly relied on a single occupation experienced a decline in their livelihood. Such 
households were reported mostly in village B and C. In village C 7 out of 8 households relied on 
orchards for their livelihood. Since 2008, these households are hardly getting any income from these  
Table 4 Households Livelihood Trajectories of Declining Households 
 
orchards. Thus, in village C, 7 out of 8 households experienced a decline in their livelihoods. The 
same was true to the shop keepers who totally relied on their shops for their income in village C. 
For example, B3(34, J) in village B, being one on of the wealthier households of village B, plunged 
Village  Wealth 
Group 
Household The main Contributing Factors 
A
 
11 A5 (14, J) 
Lack of livelihood diversification,  main  reliance on agriculture, getting no 
income from it from the previous three seasons, spent two year in Karachi due to 
life threats from Taliban +less male worker+ no compensation for damaged house 
111 A6 (8,S) Lack of livelihood diversification, main reliance on orchards+ getting no income from it from the previous three seasons 
111 A7 (9 S) Previous weak economic background, loss of house, mule (the lone earning  source) +no compensation for damaged house +animals loss 
111 A8 (8,S)  Previous weak economic background, loss of son, house, and mule – the only earning source +no compensation for damaged house +animals 
B
 
1 B1 (34, J) Lack of livelihood diversification+ Mainly relied on shops destroyed during the conflict+ received compensation for damaged houses and shops but not enough 
11 B3 (20, J)  
11 B5 (10,S) loss of established business+ less male worker + spent three years in other city due to life threat from Taliban 
1 B6 (16,J) Loss of whole sale fruit business + 3 male worker but not contributing enoug to household income + Debt burden 
1 B7 (7,S) Loss of work as barber due to Taliban+ Death and injuries of household members + Illness 
1 B8 (11, S) Previous weak economic background + Loss of barber shop + single male worker 
C
 
1 C1 (24, J) Death and injured household members + no income from orchards 
11 C3 (14, J) Lack of livelihood diversification + mainly dependent on orchards + no income from the orchards from the previous three consecutive years 
11 C4 (11, S) Lack of livelihood diversification + mainly dependent on orchards + no income from the orchards from the previous three consecutive years 
111 C5 (8, S) Same as C4 
111 C6 (11,J) 
Previous weak economic  background + no income from orchards + loss of  one 
male worker + damaged houses + received compensation for damaged house but 
not enough  
111 C7 (13, J) Previous weak economic background + no income from orchard + lack on farm work opportunities  
111 C8 (8, S) Previous  weak economic background ´+ no income from 2 jarib orchards + only one male worker 
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into economic crises, when his four shops and house were completely destroyed from a missile fired 
from a jet air plane in October 2008. As explained by the son of household head during interview. 
“From 25 years, the main profession of our family is business. Before conflict, we had four 
shops in our village situated in the same place. These shops were the only source of income 
for our household. Our average daily income from those shops was 4,000 PKRs. Within 
seconds we lost our business established by our forefathers. Now we have started our business 
right from the scratch. We got some financial support from Qatar Charity and Save the 
Children of 60000 PKRs for our business but it was not enough to start. Now, we have 
reopened only one shop with the support of retailers with whom we have good relationship.  
We also received 400,000 PKRs from PDMA as a compensation for our destroyed house, but 
it was a too small amount to build a house. We sent two of our brothers to Dubai and Saudi 
Arabia. But due to the current financial crises in Dubai my brother lost his job and came back 
home. Now he is driving a passenger vehicle in Mingora city which we purchased on 
installments. His elder son is supporting him as a conductor.” 
Household B4 (10, S) of village B also suffered a steep decline in their livelihood security when 
Taliban destroyed their shop. Their household head was a general councilor nominated in the local 
body election in 2005. Before the conflict, B4(10, S) had a well established general store with an 
average monthly income of 35,000 PKRs/month. As an anti Taliban political activist, the head of 
the B4(10,S) received life threats from the Taliban. Therefore they were forced to migrate from the 
village. The General Store-  B4(10,S)’s only source of  income- was bombed down by the Taliban. 
In 2010, the B4(10,S) sold their house and invest some money to re-open their shop. The elder son 
of the household B4(10,S)  was forced to leave his education in order to help his father to run the 
shop in their village while his father is staying back in Wah Cantt 12 and running a pity shop there.  
Access/ Inaccess to Male Labor 
Household size and composition also played an important role in determining the household’s 
capacity to cope and maintained its livelihood security in an unfavorable situation. In a majority of 
cases the households that had more male labor, were able to cope with the shocks of armed conflict 
and floods, as is in the cases of A1, A2, A3, B1, and B2. While the access to able-bodied male labor 
                                                          
12 Wah Cantt is a small city located in the North West of Islamabad- the capital of Pakistan- at the distance of 50 Km 
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does not guarantee better livelihood opportunities and outcomes but, it still provides more choices 
for those respondents without this resource (Kantor & Pain, 2011 p.15). The case of Household B6 
(16, J) having 3 male worker in village B does not illustrates this.  The head of B6(16,J) is 65 years 
old person who have two sons. He explained his story in the following manner: 
“In 1982, I migrated to Saudi Arab illegally and spent 8 years there in one stretch. Then I 
came back to my village and started to work as an orchards contractor. But in 1995 one of my 
brothers killed a person from another family in our village. As a result, our family migrated to 
Mardan13 and after spending 4 years there my family came back to our village when the 
conflict was resolved. Then I re-started my work as a contractor. But in 2007, my business 
started to decline due to the bad security situation and imposition of frequent curfew by the 
army. Then in 2009, I sent my elder son to Saudi Arab for work by borrowing money for his 
visa from my son-in- law. But after spending more than two years there, he didn’t send us a 
single penny. He is addicted to drugs and spends all the money for himself. My younger son is 
selling vegetable on handcart. Now I have to pay 1200,000 PKRs which I borrowed from 
people for my business. But at the moment I don’t have any other mean but to sell my house 




From the years, migration is very common especially in village A and B and has increased in village 
C after the armed conflict. Nearly all the coping households have members in the Middle East 
which support their households by sending remittances and the importance of remittances have 
increased during the conflict and the floods. The majority of the declining households, however, 
didn’t have any member working outside the country before the armed conflict. However, in some 
case they have people who have migrated after the conflict and the floods. The reason behind this is 
economic as well as future security situation. For example the household head of A6(8,S) in village 
A took his elder son out from school and send him to Dubai.  As his father explained it: 
                                                          
13 Mardan is a district in the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province of Pakistan 
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“In our village and surrounding areas, the Taliban has more influence on the young people. The 
majority of the Taliban supporters were between ages 14 to 30 years. At least 100 people mostly 
young men lost their lives in our village and surrounding area during and after the operation. Now 
the people are afraid of the future of their young generation and as a response they are sending 
their children to Karachi or the Middle East. I also send my elder son to Dubai while he was 
studying in high school. His mother was always worried about his future therefore we sold our 
buffalo to pay half fees of the visa and the remaining were paid by my son after four months. We 
know that his salary is not good but still we are happy that our son is secure now”. 
 Some case households in village C had to migrate due to declining opportunities in agriculture 
especially in the orchard sector during and after the conflict and the floods. For example household 
C3 (14, J) and C6 (11, J) send their members to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia for work after conflict 
and floods. Before the conflict their main income was from their orchards. As the head of household 
C3(14,J) illustrated it:  
“We are doing farming since the time of our forefathers. We have apple and peach orchards 
on 8 acres. These orchards were the main source of our household income. But since 2007 we 
are hardly getting any income from these orchards. We have three male labors in our 
household. One of my brothers has a small grocery shop in the village but his business is 
going down day by day as the people are not able to pay the money for the goods they have 
purchased from him on credit basis. In 2010 we were expecting some income from our 
orchards but unfortunately due to the floods we were not able to sell it out due to road and 
bridge destruction.  We lost our hope to get something from our orchards and therefore we 
sold out our wives jewelry and sent one brother to Malaysia for work in Dec. 2010. Now, he is 
sending money after every second months.” 
Although migration has been a regular phenomenon for years, there is an increasing trend in 
seasonal migration has been reported in all the three villages after the armed conflict and the floods 
especially among the poor households. People in these households don’t have resources to pay visa 
fees to go abroad and therefore opt for the opportunities available in other parts of the country. 
Before the armed conflict, orchard sectors provided local job opportunities for these people 
especially in the picking season. But these opportunities disappeared during these crises and as 
result more and more people started to migrate seasonally for work especially in the months of  
April and May for wheat cutting  and from November to March for sugar cane crushing season in 
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Kashmir, Punjab and Sind provinces. From 2009, household C6 (11, J) and C8 (13, J) started to 
migrate to Punjab and Sind provinces for work in sugar cane crushing seasons. As explained by C8 
(13, J) household head: 
“Before the conflict we went only for wheat cutting season in Azad Kashmir and Punjab areas 
of Pakistan and from August to November we worked in orchards in our areas but from the 
previous two years there have been very few work opportunities available for us in our area.  
Therefore, we are also going to Punjab and Sind provinces to work in sugar mills in the 
months of November to March each year.” 
Human Losses and Injuries/Illness: 
The death and injuries of people in armed conflict has pushed four households into economic crises. 
Two permanent government employees of household C1 (28, J) were killed in the air bombardment 
in October, 2008 by the army. The household head explained his situation as: 
“Armed conflict brought a complete disaster for our household. We lost our two elder 
brothers which changed the whole scenario for our household. They were government 
employees in the education department and Water and Power Development Authority 
(WAPDA). They brought 80,000 PKRs/month as salaries. I and my brother’s wife were 
seriously injured during the same bombardment. My old mother could not bear the loss of her 
sons and died of heart attack after four months. We received as 1200,000 PKRs as a 
compensation for my brother’s death and the house damaged but half of the money was used 
to repay the amount we had borrowed for the funerals and injured treatment. And now, our 
household income is mainly depending on the government pensions of our martyred brothers 
and the shuttering business which I am running from the previous six years.”  
The head of Household B7(7,S) in village B also lost their two children when a mortar hit his house 
and he and his wife got seriously injured. The household head is a barber by cast. He was running 
his barber shop from 20 years back in the village market. 1n 2006, the Taliban banned shaving and 
warned all the barbers to stop making shaving people; otherwise, they would face serious 
consequences. He told his tragic story: 
“One day when I was busy in my work, Taliban came and dragged me out of the shop. They 
beat me mercilessly and put all my equipments out and burned it. Then I borrowed 40,000 Rs 
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from my father-in-law and went to Oman illegally for work. There I worked hard day and 
night but unfortunately after eight months I had pain in my right leg and it became very 
difficult to continue to work. Therefore, I came back to home for treatment. I removed my 
elder son from school and re-opened a barber shop for him. In December 2008, a mortar hit 
my house, in which I lost two sons including my elder son running the barber shop. I and my 
wife also got seriously injured. I got 1200,000 as a compensation for the death of our sons 
and damaged house. I spent 300,000 PKRs for me and my wife treatment but still we have not 
fully recovered. My elder brother is also demanding a share of the amount I received as 
compensation. Now I am not able to do any work because of my poor health condition and I 
am worried about the future of my household.” 
Loss and Sale of Animals 
In the study area it was found that the villagers kept buffalos and cows to support their daily food 
consumption by using milk, yogurt, oil, cheese. The mules were using for transportation. About 
70% of the case households reported that before the conflict they had kept buffalos or cows for milk 
and related products for their daily food consumptions. During the armed operation 75% of the case 
households sold (at less than half of the market price) their animals to finance their daily 
consumption needs while 15% reported that they had lost their animal in bombardment or burning 
down their house by the army especially in village A. Wealthier households were able to restock 
livestock as in the case of A2 in village A while the medium and poor households were not able to 
do so. The loss or sale of animals brought more pressure on the poor households as they now are 
dependent on market for those things (especially milk and oil) which they used to get them from 
their animals. 
 Households A6 (8, S) and A8 (9, S) in village A lost their mules which were the only source of 
income for their households. They used to transport people goods on their mules. Household A6 (8, 
S) lost their two mules when its house was burned down by the Army. The head of Household A6 
(8, S) explained his miserable story like this: 
“From our forefathers, our profession was to transport goods on mules. Before the conflict, I 
had two mules to transport goods and earn some money for my household. My elder son was 
also supporting me in my work. Before the armed operation, my elder son was captured by the 
Taliban and they kept him for three months in their private jail and later on forced him to join 
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them and he, eventually, disappeared during the operation. I also lost my both mules when my 
house was burned by the army. The army refuses me to register to get house compensation as 
they considered me to be a Taliban supporter. So l lost my son and the mules. Now I am 
working as a labor on the farm of our village Malak on a fixed salary of 3000 PKRs, which is 
not enough to fulfill basic needs of my eight members’ household.” 
6.4. Summary 
To sum up, the high number of declining households indicates an overall decline in household’s 
livelihood security in the study villages. The factors which enabled the coping households to 
maintain their livelihood security are international remittances, wealth, more male workers, 
government jobs and political connection. The factors which lead to the decline of the majority of 
case households are: low or lack of livelihood diversification, human losses and injuries/illness 
especially among the male workers, and loss of livestock. Migration for work was found to be the 
most prominent response in both crises especially in village B and C. Those households which had 
enough resources sent their members abroad for work while others opted for local work 
opportunities available seasonally in different parts of the country. The case evidences also shows 
that almost all households belonged to medium and poor wealth categories were further pushed into 













Chapter 7:  Social Assistance and Aid Delivery 
The previous chapters discussed the case household’s livelihood trajectories in the context of armed 
conflict and floods. It also explained in detail the factors contributing to the coping as well as the 
declining households. This chapter will focus on the interventions and the extent to which they 
supported people livelihoods and infrastructure development aftermath of the armed conflict and 
floods. 
During field interviews it was found that villagers have received assistance from state and non state 
actors as well as from informal sources. However, the large number of households with declining 
livelihoods security indicates the inadequacy or limitations of assistance. 
7.1. State Assistance 
In the study villages, it has been reported that government provide financial assistance of 25,000 
PKRs /household during the displacement. However, some of the case households pointed out that 
they did not receive this amount due the lost or unavailability of the National Identity Card at the 
time of registration. The main beneficiaries of the government assistance were those households 
which suffered direct losses in the form of human death or house damage. It has been reported that 
the government provided compensation of 300,000 PKRs/person death and 400,000 and 150,000 
PKRs for completely and partially damaged houses respectively. However, the compensation of 
damaged houses was not enough to rebuild the houses and the majority of the case households used 
alternative sources to finance their house reconstruction. The people did not receive any 
compensation for the loss of household items and the animals that perished. In the flood emergency, 
the government provided agricultural inputs in the form of fertilizers, seeds/seedlings and tools to 
the farmers. The government also wrote off the agricultural loan of the farmers but this mainly 
benefited the large farmers. For example landlord of village A was one of the main beneficiaries by 
writing off 1800,000 PKRs payable loan 
The government provided compensation on the basis of a survey conducted by the army which 
according to the participants of FGD in the village B and C was fair and based on reality and free of  
any political or Malak influence . However, in village A, participants claimed to have been 
discriminated made by the army as their village was ignored during the registration process. To 
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prevent corruption, the amount was transferred to the bank account of the household head. 
However, villagers were complaining of long delays. 
7.2. NGOs Assistance 
 Several international and national non-governmental organizations also provided relief assistance in 
the s villages. The main organizations that worked or are working in the villages are: World Food 
Program (WFP), UNHCR, Save the Children (US), Qatar Charity, Literate Masses, Lassona, 
German Technical Organization (GTZ), Agency for Technical Corporation and Development 
(ACTED) . 
WFP is mainly concern with food distribution. They provided food ration for 6 months when people 
returned to their homes in August, 2009. They also distributed food ration for 4 months after the 
2010 floods. They also run nutrition project for school children by providing biscuit and oil for 
children and school teachers in village C. UNCHR provided shelters for the affected people in  the 
armed conflict as well as in the floods. Qatar charity provided cash grants for shopkeepers in village 
B and C. For example, they distributed cash grants of 3.5 million PKRs in 174 shopkeepers in 
village B and C. Save the Children (US) also distributed cash grants of 10 million PKRs in 450 
affected households in B and C. Literate Masses with the support of Action Aid Pakistan 
implemented three cash for work (CFW) projects worth of 6 million PKRs in all the study villages 
in the emergency phase of the armed conflict. GTZ started its activities in collaboration with the 
Literate Masses during flood emergency and has focused on infrastructure development. So far they 
have implemented four projects of water supply and irrigation schemes in village B and C. 
From table 3 it has been obvious that compared to B and C, village A received the least o assistance 
during the armed conflict as well as during the floods. The main reason behind this was that two of 
the main Taliban Leaders belonged to this village and they got much support in the village and 
surrounding areas. During the operations the Pakistan Army faced tough resistance in the village 
and suffered causalities. As a result the villagers got the label of being Taliban supporters. After the 
operation, the army set up 4 check posts and the mobility of the villagers and the outsiders in the 
village were kept tight. Initially, only government departments and UN agencies provided assistance 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.3. The Effects of these Interventions on the Case Households.  
During the interviews almost all respondents reported that they have received assistance in one form 
or another. It was also reported that all the households were eligible to receive assistance. All the 
respondents received food ration for eight months under the WFP program but the quantity of ration 
was fixed irrespective of the household size. Every household received a monthly food package 
including 50 kg flour, 4 kg sugar, 4 kg pulses and 4 kg oil but this package was enough to fulfill the 
food requirements of bigger households but only lasted for 10 days. The money injection under the 
Cash for Work and Cash grants projects implemented by different NGOs were also considered very 
important for the revival of economic activities in the villages but they were also limited in term of 
household coverage in each village. The compensation provided by governments for human losses 
and house damages were also reported limited in term of quantity and scope and the majority of the 
households still waiting for compensation. Furthermore, no compensation was provided for the 
damages of household items, human injuries and animal losses and consequently the majority of the 
respondents relied on informal assistance to cover the expenses. When asked about the importance 
of assistance provided by the state and the NGOs, a key informant in village C replied as 
“Many organizations have provided assistance in our village and surrounding areas but the 
people problems are more to solve with these assistance. The main problem is that people are 
many and the assistance is not enough. This assistance is only for a short time and the people 
have to struggle themselves to rebuild their lives. And even wealthy people are always 
standing in lines to get assistance and even though they know that other people are in more 
need than they are but they have no shame. I have also noticed that they sell these things later 
on.”    
7.4. Assistance from Informal Sources  
During interviews it has been pointed out that informal assistance in the form of Zakat14 or 
Khairat15 has been reduced during and after the armed conflict as well the floods. As one of the 
respondent in village C said: 
                                                          
14 Giving food or money to poor as religious obligation 
15 Obligatory payment made annually under Islamic law on certain kinds of property and used for charitable and religious purposes 
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“Before the armed conflict and the floods, the well off people of the village paid Zakat or 
Khairat to the poor people as their religious obligation. As all the people in the village were 
directly or indirectly affected in both crises, it reduced the capacity of well off villagers to do 
khairaat or pay Zakaat. Even the relatives living in the village are not in a  position to extend 
support to each other as they did before in time of illness, marriages, conflict etc.” 
Informal assistance was demonstrated during the people’s displacement in armed conflict. It has 
been reported that only 20% of the IDPs were accommodated in the government run refugee camps 
in Peshawar, Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda districts of Khyper Pukhtunkhwa province while 80% 
were accommodated by their relatives and non relatives (Pakistan Humanitarian Response Plan  
2008-2009). The people shared houses, hujras, mosque and schools to accommodate the displaced 
people. The people also collected donations to provide food and other related items to the IDPs. As 
narrated by one of the participant in FGD in village B: 
“We cannot forget the generosity and hospitality of our brothers. I spent 3 months in Mardan 
with a family. They accommodated my family in their hujra.  They were not wealthy but still 
provided us with food, clothes, and other items necessary for our living.”  
During interviews some of the respondents pointed out that they borrowed money from their 
relatives living in other parts of the country for house reconstruction and other purposes as in the 
case of A2(23,J). The A2(23,J) head explained: 
“We have very a strong relationship with our relatives living in other parts of the country. We 
help each other financially at the occasion of marriages, death, and conflicts. My cousin living 
in Karachi provided us with accommodation as well as foods for three month during our 
displacement. I borrowed 500,000 PKRs from him for our house reconstruction. Five years 
back I also borrowed him 100,000 PKRs for his son marriage and in this way our relationship 
is getting stronger and stronger with the passage of time.” 
 However, this was not the case with the poorer households. For example, A6(8,S) head in village A 
said: 
“My relatives living in Charsadda district are financially good. Even though they know that 
my family is in crises, they did not provide me any support. I lost my son, house and mule 
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during the conflict. I want to reconstruct my house but my relatives refuse to give me credit as 
they know that I will not be able to repay them. No one is ready to trust poor people like me.”   
7.5. Aid Capture by Malaks  
 Aid captured by Malaks (village’s traditional leaders) has been reported in village A and B. 
Respondents in village A and B complained that government official and NGOs workers distributed 
relief and emergency aid through village Malaks and Malaks preferred mostly their relatives and 
political supporters in the village. For example, in village A, the Government, WFP and UNCHR 
provided relief and emergency support through the Malaks and they distributed the food ration and 
shelter among their relatives and political supporters. They also sold half of the agricultural inputs 
provided by the government during the flood emergency. However, their influence has been reduced 
by the presence of CBOs in village B and C. As explained by one of participants in FGD in village B 
“At the initial stage of emergency, the government and UN agencies provided assistance 
through our village Malak. He is an important political figure in the area. He favors his 
relatives and his political supporters. Through CBO platform, we lodged complain against 
him in UNHCR and WFP regional offices. Then they and other NGOs provided assistance 
through CBO platform because it has developed credibility in the village by identifying and 
providing assistance to the people most in need from any quam(tribe or clan) of the village 
without any political discrimination.”    
7.6. Summary 
From the above discussion it can be concluded that villagers received assistance from state and non 
state actors. However, this assistance was not enough in quantity and coverage to fulfill the needs of 
the people. The higher incidence of declining households also shows the limitation of these 
interventions. Due to the limitation of formal assistance, the villagers relied on informal assistance 







Chapter 8: Conclusion 
Three research questions have structured this investigation into livelihood trajectories in the context 
of man-made and natural disasters in three villages of district Swat, Pakistan. These questions aimed 
to finding out what these trajectories have been and how and why they varied between households 
and villages, exploring how the case household’s livelihoods affected and what were their 
implications for the welfare of households. It also aimed to assess the effect of assistance provided 
by outside actors on household livelihood security.     
Evidences from chapter 4 shows that the households in the three study villages were differed in their 
main livelihoods sources. It was found that households in village A was mainly dependent on 
international remittances, village B economy was mainly based on local business while village C 
was agrarian.  
The case evidence shows that out of 24 case households only 7 were able to maintain their 
livelihoods security while 17 faced decline. However, it can be varies among the three case villages. 
In 17 declining households 4 were found in Village A, 6 were in village B and 7 were in village C.  
The mains reason behind the higher incidence of declining households in village B and C seems to 
be the lack of livelihoods diversification as well as their reliance on local resources. For example in 
village C, all the declining households were relying on orchards which were badly affected in armed 
conflict and floods 
 The factors which enabled the coping households to maintain their livelihood security are 
international remittances, wealth, more male worker, government jobs and political connection. The 
factors which lead to the decline of majority of case households are: low or lack of livelihood 
diversification, human losses and injuries/illness especially the male worker, loss of livestock. Some 
of the declining households responded by sending one or two of the household abroad. However, 
some declining households who had not enough resources for international migration opts for local 
work opportunities available seasonally in other parts of the country. Those households whose main 
dependence was on agriculture especially orchards for their household income, had left no option for 
their income so they responded to migrate abroad or locally for work. The case evidences also shows 
that almost all the households belonged to medium and poor wealth categories were further pushed 
into more vulnerable situations. 
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The case study also shows that villagers received assistance from state and non state actors. 
However, this assistance was not enough in quantity and coverage to fulfill the needs of the people. 
The higher incidence of declining households also shows the limitation of these interventions. Due 
to the limitation of formal assistance, the villagers relied on informal assistance or other sources to 
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member working in 
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Non farm labor 
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may not be 
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